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et al.: Recent Cases

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW: Can a Principal in Larceny be Convicted of
Receiving Stolen Goods?- Defendant transferred stolen tobacco t6
his truck, paying the thieves for the goods which he knew had been
stolen. The day following the theft, defendant sold the tobacco.
At the election of the state, he was tried and convicted solely of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen. Defendant
claimed that the testimony tended to prove him guilty of larceny
only, which count, as to him, had been eliminated from the indictment. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Although a guilty participant in the theft, he took no part in the actual caption and asportation. Hence no error was committed in refusing defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. State v.Sweat, 221 S. C. 270, 70 S. E. 2d

234 (1952).
The general rule in most jurisdictions is that one who is guilty
of actual caption and asportation, whether alone or jointly with another, is not guilty of receiving stolen goods because he cannot receive
them from himself. Leon v. State, 21 Ariz. 418, 189 Pac. 433, 9
A.L.R. 1393 (1920) ; People v. Taylor, 4 Cal. App. 2d 214, 40 P. 2d
870 (1935) ; Adams v. State, 60 Fla. 1, 53 So. 451 (1910). This rule
is followed in South Carolina, where a guilty participant in larceny
can be convicted of receiving stolen goods only if he took no part
in the caption and asportation, but participated merely as an accessory before or after the fact. State v. Tindall, 213 S. C. 484, 50
S. E. 2d 188 (1948). If the two acts constitute distinct offenses,
the misdemeanor of receiving is not merged in the offense of being
an accessory to the felony, since the less is merged with the greater
crime only when they result from the same act or a continuing transaction. State v. Coppenburg, 2 Strob. 273, 33 S.C.L. 132 (1847).
In most states receiving stolen goods is a distinct crime, not an
accessorial act to the crime. State v. Crawford, 39 S. C. 343, 17
S. E. 799 (1893).
An opposite rule is followed in some states, based primarily on
the application of statutes defining "principals" and "guilty participants". By the provisions of some statutes receivers are made
guilty of larceny, Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 710, 112
S. 1,. 624 (1922) ; by others they are made accessories after the fact,
Edwards v. State, 80 Ga. 127, 4 S. E. 268 (1887). People v. Kupperschnidt, 237 N. Y. 463, 143 N. E. 256 (1924), overruled a number of prior New York decisions and established a second rule that
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the thief who delivers stolen goods to a receiver becomes his accomplice and is thus a principal in the misdemeanor of receiving stolen
goods as well as a principal in larceny. The most important question under this rule is whether participation in the larceny by one
accused of receiving the goods is of such a character as to make
the receiving a part of the theft itself, or so distinct as to constitute
the separate offense defined in the statute as receiving. Smith v.
State, 59 Ohio St. 350, 52 N. E. 826 (1898). The general rule
not allowing a principal in larceny to be convicted of receiving is inapplicable where receiving is not embraced in the caption and asportation. Leon v. State, 21 Ariz. 418, 189 Pac. 433, 9 A.L.R. 1393 (1920).
If receiving takes place after the completion of the larceny, a confederate of the thief may be charged with the receiving. Adams v.
State, 60 Fla. 1, 53 So. 451 (1910). Another divergence from the
general rule, though in the opposite direction, is found in a number
of Texas decisions holding that a conspirator in commission of theft,
but not present at commission, may or may not be convicted as receiver depending on whether the thief's interest ceases at the time
of delivery. Gammel v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. Rep. 328, 62 S. W.
2d 139 (1933). Where stolen property is turned over to a conspirator who was not present at the commission, under an agreement of
division of the loot, it has been held that the person so receiving the
property is a principal in the theft and connot be convicted as a receiver of stolen goods. Byrd v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 489, 38
S. W. 2d 332 (1931).
At present three different views are held in the United States
concerning a principal in larceny being guilty of the crime of receiving. One view, appearing to be the majority rule, -with which
South Carolina is in accord, holds that the only principals in larceny
who may be convicted of receiving are those who did not engage in
the actual caption and asportation. In addition, the receiving must
be subsequent to the completed theft. A second view, as in New
York and a few other jurisdictions, makes all principals, even the
thief himself, open to conviction for receiving. A third, represented
by some Texas cases, allows none of the larceny principals, artificial
as well as actual, to be convicted of receiving stolen goods. The purpose of the statutes which make receiving stolen goods a crime is not
to inflict dual punishment on the thief, but rather to extend the
power of the law to reach those persons such as "fences", who are
immune to the conviction of larceny itself. An extreme application
of a statute, as shown by the New York view, tends to overlook the
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purpose for which these statutes were designed, while the other two
views appear to keep this purpose in mind.
HARVY L. GOLDN.

MORTGAGES: Interest on Unliquidated Demands. - Mortgagee's devisee brought a mortgage foreclosure action against mortgagor, a physician, who sought to offset reasonable value of medical
services rendered to mortgagee and his family from 1915 to 1940.
The lower court rendered a decree allowing the offset and awarded
interest on the annual unliquidated and open accounts from the year
1915. On appeal, HELD: interest on the offset, which was unliquidated, was properly allowed from year 1932, but interest for
services rendered during the period 1915 to 1931 was improperly
allowed in view of execution of renewal note in 1931 calculated
by crediting value of services to mortgagee's employees. Mortgagor's failure at that time to demand and obtain credit for value
of services to mortgagee and his family was considered a waiver
to any claim of interest on this amount. Anderson v. Purvis, 220
S. C. 259, 67 S. R. 2d 80 (1951).
As a general rule interest is not allowed on running accounts as
long as they remain open and unliquidated, Burriss v. Burriss, 113
S. C. 370, 101 S. E. 863 (1919) ; Edwards v. Dargan, 30 S. C. 177,
8 S. 9. 858 (1888) ; Skirving v. Executors of Janes Stobo, 2 Bay
233 (S. C. 1799), unless there is some statutory provision that permits it, Empson Packing Co. v. Hopkins, 66 Colo. 421, 182 Pac. 876
(1919); Browning v. El Paso Lumber Co., 140 S. W. 386 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911), or unless there is some express or implied contract
between the parties providing interest shall be paid. Lee v. Hill,
92 S. C. 114, 75 S. E. 273 (1910). Also interest may be allowed
on open or unliquidated accounts where there is some custom or
usage to that effect. South Carolinav. Port Royal & Augusta Rwy.,
89 Fed. 565 (C.C.D. S. C. 1898); Searson v. Heyward, 1 Speers
249 (S. C. 1843). Interest on open or unliquidated accounts may
also be allowed where an administrator has been guilty of fraud or
imposition. Conyer'.s Ad-n'r. v. Magrath, 4 McCord 392 (S. C.
1827). It has been repeatedly held by the law courts that interest
on open or unliquidated demands is not allowable. Bolch v. Smith,
126 S. C. 338, 119 S. R. 909 (1923); Fairfield v. Bonner, 2 Hill
468 (S. C. 1834). The common law rule that interest does not
accrue on open or unliquidated accounts, however, is not binding

Published by Scholar Commons, 1953

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 11
RECENT CASES

upon a court of equity. Pettus v. Clawson, 4 Rich. Eq. 92 (S. C.
1851); Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F. 2d 353 (10th Cir. 1935). Equity may allow interest on demands not bearing interest at law but
in its discretion may withhold it. Pettus v. Clawson, supra. Interest will be allowed according to the equities of the case. Epworth
Orphanage v. Long, 207 S. C. 384, 36 S. E. 2d 37 (1945); Brown
v. Smith, 3 Rich. Eq. 465 (S. C. 1851); Woerz v. Schumacher,
161 N. Y. 530, 56 N. E. 72 (1900). Where there are laches in
prosecuting a claim not bearing interest at law, equity generally
refuses to allow interest. Brown v. Smith, supra. Laches will
not be imputed, however, to infants, and equity will allow interest
where he prosecutes his rights within the statutory period. Pettus
v. Clawson, supra. Interest for personal services is not allowed
because such actions ordinarily originate in law courts. Farrand
v. Bouchell, Harper 83, (S. C. 1823); Knight v. Mitchell, 3 Brev.
506 (S. C. 1814). And as previously pointed out, law courts
refuse to grant interest on open or unliquidated demands. Bloch
v. Smith, supra. Because the amount is not ascertainable, interest
cannot be computed until judgment is rendered. People v. Wilcox,
207 N. Y. 743, 101 N. E. 174 (1913).
Although the courts have recognized the principle that equity
will allow interest on unliquidated or open accounts where it would
be inequitable to withhold it, such principle has been rarely invoked
in South Carolina. In the instant case, had the physician initiated
an action to collect for services rendered, it is reasonably deducible that interest would not have been allowed since the case
would have been adjudicated by the law court. Thus the decision
reached in the instant case points out differences in results obtained which depend entirely on whether an action is brought in
law or equity. Regardless of this conflict, rules of equity have
become so firmly implanted in our decisions that no departure
appears probable. Because of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the result is therefore in conformity with established equitable
principles.
G. Ross ANDERSON, JR.
PROPERTY: Adverse Possession By Mortgagee. - Plaintiff's intestate died owning land subject to a mortgage. Defendant purchased
and became assignee of the mortgage in 1926 and was thereupon
put in possession of the land by plaintiffs, heirs of the intestate, all
parties believing the assignment to be an absolute conveyance. Since
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1926 defendant has claimed uninterruptedly as owner of the fee.
Plaintiffs contend mortgagor-mortgagee relationship still exists and
bring action for possession of the land. The trial court held that
the defendant had acquired title in the property by adverse possession.
On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The mortgagor-mortgagee relationship was repudiated and no longer existed; therefore the defendant
acquired title to the property by adverse possession. Fogle v. Void,
S. C ._ (Jan. 31, 1953).
By statute, South Carolina is a lien state, whereby title remains in
the mortgagor until a foreclosure and sale is made of the mortgaged
property. S. C. CODE § 45-51 (1952). A mortgage on realty, therefore, does not convey title but constitutes only a lien to satisfy the
debt. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. Lemmons, 159 S. C.
121, 155 S. E. 591 (1930). Thus mortgages are nothing more than
security for debts in South Carolina. Marslallv. Crawford, 45 S. C;

189, 22 S. E. 792 (1894). The authorities are in agreement that
the mortgagee, in possession as such, cannot claim title by adverse
possession, Frady v. Ivester, 129 S. C. 536, 125 S. E. 134 (1923);
Lipscomb v. Talbot, 243 Mo. 1, 147 S. W. 798 (1912). This legal relationship, however, does not prevent a mortgagee in possession from
holding adversely to the mortgagor's legal title, nor preclude him from
perfecting legal title in himself by adverse possession, Fradyv. Ivester,
supra; Ham v. Flowers, 214 S. C. 212, 51 S. E. 2d 753 (1949), provided he distinctly disavows and repudiates the mortgage relationship
and notice thereof is brought home to the mortgagor. Ham v.
Flowers, supra. When the mortgagor has knowledge that the mortgagee is no longer holding the land as mortgagee, then the holding
is adverse, Frady v. Ivester, supra, but until notice of this repudiation is given to the mortgagor, a quasi-trustee relationship exists and
possession will not be regarded as adverse.

Morgan v. Morgan, 10

Ga. 297 (1851). The maxim, "once a mortgage, always a mortgage,"
continues only so long as the debtor-creditor relationship exists and
does not extend to an agreement whereby the creditor surrenders
his rights as a creditor and the mortgagor his right as the holder of
legal title. Brockington v. Lynch, 119 S. C. 273, 112 S. E. 94 (1920).
To acquire title by adverse possession the holding must be adverse,
open, notorious, exclusive, hostile and continuous for the period of
possession, Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177, 160 S. E. 436 (1928) ;
Southern Railway Co. v. Mayer, 159 S. C. 332, 157 S. E. 6 (1931),
and the possessor must hold the property in his own right and not
for another, SUnher v. Murphy, 2 Hill 488, 27 Am. Dec. 397 (S. C.
1834). The person so holding must be in actual possession of the
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land. Bailey v. Irby, 2 Nott & McC. 343, (S. C. 1820). Actual residence, however, is not essential, Lewis v. Pope, 86 S. C. 285, 68 S. E.
680 (1910) ; nor is it necessary that the owner of the property know
of the possessor's hostile possession, when it is so notorious that he
should have known by ordinary diligence. Graniteville Co. v. Willians, 209 S. C. 112, 39 S. R. 2d 202 (1946). To be hostile there
must be the intention to dispossess the owner. Ouzts v. McKnight,
114 S. C. 303, 103 S. E. 561 (1920). When all the necessary elements of adverse possession are present and the mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship has been repudiated and no longer exists, title may then
be vested in the mortgagee as in any other adverse holder. Frady v.
Ivester, supra.
In the instant case the court followed the view of most jurisdictions. When a man knows that another claims and is enjoying that
which belongs to him, and neglects to prosecute his claims in the
courts when there is nothing to prevent his doing so, he should be
and is rightly barred from making his claims after an unreasonable
time, as prescribed by statute. The fact that a person was a mortgagee at one time should not and does not take away any of his rights,
nor does it add to them. The instant case seems to be sound as it
follows the rule which discourages the making of stale demands.
EmORY B. BRocic.

CRMINAL LAW: Time for Argument. - Appellant and twentyone others were indicted and convicted of conspiring together to set
up and exposing to be played a certain lottery commonly known as
the "numbers game." None of the defendants offered evidence in
order to have the right to the opening and the closing arguments
after all evidence was in. The trial judge, over defendants' objection, allowed each defense attorney only five minutes in which to
reply to the state's argument. On appeal, HELD: reversed. The
trial judge, in limiting each attorney for the various defendants to
five minutes closing argument, unreasonably exercised his power of
limiting argument to less than the two hours statutory period otherwise allowed. State v. Mclntire, 221 S. C. 504, 71 S. E. 2d 410
(1952).
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
be fully heard in his defense by himself or by his counsel or both.
S. C.

CoNsT.,

Art. I, Sec. 18 (1895).

The state must make the

opening argument because of its burden to establish the guilt of the
accused, and the defendant is entitled to hear the position of the
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state. State v. Atterberry, 129 S. C. 464, 124 S. R. 648 (1923).
The defendant in criminal cases has a right to the concluding argument before the jury when he introduces no testimony on the trial.
State v. Brisbane, 2 Bay 451 (S. C. 1802). But where a witness,
introduced by one of two prisoners tried jointly, is also examined
by the other, both will be regarded as having introduced evidence
and the state is entitled to the concluding argument. State v. Huckie,
22 S. C. 298 (1884); State v. Chreitsburgh, 4 McCord 30 (S. C.
1826). An accused who has the right to open and reply after all
evidence is in may waive either or both of such rights, and if he
declines to open, he will still retain the right to make the closing argument to the jury. State v. Garlington, 90 S. C. 138, 72 S. R.
564 (1911). The defendant by introducing evidence loses the right
to make the opening and closing arguments. State v. Gellis, 158
S. C. 471, 155 S. R. 849 (1930). The order in which arguments
on behalf of the prosecutor and of the defendant shall be made, State
v. Garlington,supra, and the time allowed, are generally in the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 7
S. U. 413, 13 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1888). South Carolina, however,
provides that no attorney, solicitor, or counsellor shall be allowed to
occupy more than two hours of the time of the court in the argument of any cause, unless he shall first obtain the special permission
of the court to do so. S. C. Comi § 56-143 (1952). This limitation
was intended to prevent abuse of the broad constitutional guaranty
of the -ight to be fully heard in defense. It gives accused two hours
in which to argue his case as a matter of right and additional time as
a matter of grace. State v. Ballenger, 202 S. C. 155, 24 S. R. 2d
175 (1942). If, before the argument commenced, counsel for the
defendant were informed that they would be limited to the time
allowed by law, this limitation is enforceable. State v. Jones, 29
S. C. 201, 7 S. E. 296 (1888). The Code limits the time for argument, unless special permission be first obtained, and leaves the
court the discretionary power to fix a shorter time limit in criminal
cases. State v. Blackstone, 113 S. C. 528, 101 S. R. 845 (1917).
This discretion is abused by limiting the argument by the defense
to one hour in a prosecution for murder where some twenty-five
witnesses have testified during the trial. State v. Cash, 138 S. C.
167, 136 S. R. 222 (1925); State v. Ballezger, supra.
The ruling of the trial court prevented a free hearing for the
accused and was thus reversed by the supreme court. The length
of time for reply to be permitted at each trial has to be decided on
the basis of the case before the trial court. Where there are a
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large number of defendants the judge should grant more time than
the statutory period. A set period of time would not provide sufficient flexibility to provide for a full hearing of each defendant
when there are a number of defendants involved. In fact, the
statute itself would be unconstitutional had it not allowed the court
power to vary the time as required by the necessities of each case.
The courts maintain a balance by using a test which is flexible and
capable of meeting varying circumstances. The decision of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has erred
sufficiently in its exercise of discretion so that a full hearing was
not given each accused.
MATTIM BMLI WIBURN.

INSURANCE: Acceptance of Application by Failure to Reject.
-Plaintiff
was solicited by the insurer for life insurance, for
which the plaintiff und her husband made application. The first
premium for each policy accompanied the application. Later the
insurer returned the plaintiff's policy but not the one of her husband. The plaintiff did not know of the rejection of her husband's
application until three months after application date. Previous to
notice of rejection, her husband was killed. Plaintiff brings this
action to recover under husband's policy. Defense was that there
was no contract until the insurer accepted the application by issuing the policy. jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, HELD:
affirmed. Acceptance of application for policy could be reasonably
implied and insurer was estopped to assert that there was no contract of insurance. Moore v. PalnettoState Life Insurance Company,

73 S. E. 2d 688 (S. C. 1953).
A contract of insurance, like any other contract, is complete and
binding only when an offer made by one party is accepted by the
other. Neither the offer nor the acceptance, however, need be in
any particular form. Any acts or words showing an intention to
make an offer and to give an acceptance are sufficient to establish a
binding contract. VAxI-c, INSURANac 209 (3d ed. 1951). An application for life insurance is a mere offer or proposal and, until
accepted, no contractual relationship exists between the applicant and
the insurance company. Keller v. ProvidentLife and Accident Insurance Company, 213 S. C. 339, 49 S. E. 2d 577 (1948). "There
is a conflict of authorities as to whether legal obligations arise only
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after a contract of insurance has been made, or whether in certain
circumstances a legal duty arises, from the relationship created during the negotiations between an applicant for insurance and the insurance company, to act promptly upon the application, and to inform
the applicant whether the offer is accepted or rejected." Bekhen v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 70 N. D. 122,
293 N. W. 200, 209 (1940). Under the latter view, where it is
shown that the offeror is the plaintiff, silence by the offeree will
constitute acceptance if there is a "duty" to speak, as distinguished
from the mere right to speak. Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513 (1876).
The offeree has been held to have been under a duty to notify the
offeror of his rejection of an offer which he has induced. ColeMcIntyre Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 214 S. W. 817 (Tenn. 1919).
Failure to notify applicant could cause him to be lulled into the
belief that he is covered by insurance or it could put him to prejudicial delay in seeking protection elsewhere. Tobacco Redrying
Corp. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 185 S. C. 162,
193 S. E. 426 (1939). These cases are based on a test of moral
duty, by which the courts may determine whether the insurer has
acted reasonably in notifying applicant of rejection of application.
The offeree's omission to return the premium has been deemed a
sufficient communication of his acceptance, because he is under a
duty either to return the premium or accept the offer. This is why
a few cases, albeit a distinct minority, have held that undue delay
in notifying the applicant of the rejection of his application will constitute an acceptance of the policy. American Life Insurance Co.
of Alabama v. Hutcheson, 109 Fed. 2d 424 (6th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 310 U. S. 625 (1940); DeFord v. New York Life Insurance Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Strand v. Bankers'
Life Insurance Co. of Lincoln, 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349
(1927). An insurance company is entitled to a reasonable time
within which to investigate and act on the application, and if
death occurs before expiration of that reasonable period, no liability results. Harding v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 188
So. 177 (La. 1939). "Mere delay by the insurer, although unreasonable, in acting upon an application for insurance does not,
under the majority view, raise any implication of acceptance, nor
does it estop the insurer to deny the existence of a contract"
VANc", INsu.ANc.

225 (3d ed. 1951).

This tends to establish

an objective standard test as contrasted to the moral duty test mentioned above. Under the minority rule, it is usually a jury question as to whether the insurer was guilty of unreasonable delay
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in acting on an original application of insurance. The facts of
each case differ, and it is impossible to lay down any hard and
fast rule as to the number of days, weeks or months the insurer
has in which to act. If it is clear that there has been no unreasonable delay, the court will so hold as a matter of law. Harding v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra. It has been held that
sixty-two days of delay was not unreasonable. Rocky Mount Savings
& Trust Company v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 201 N. C. 552, 160
S. E. 831 (1931).
In regard to silence or inaction as acceptance, theoretically acceptance is but the expression of a condition of the mind and may
be evidenced by passive as well as by active conduct by the offeree.
Coffin v. Planter's Cotton Co., 124 Ark. 360, 187 S. W. 309
(1916). The conduct of the offeree in previous dealing or in earlier stages of the existing negotiation may have justified the offeror
in understanding silence as assent. If he does so understand, there
is a contract. I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 91C (1936).
South
Carolina is not strictly in accord in this view. Cases have held
that silence is not considered acceptance unless so agreed by the
parties, nor will there be a contract until an "act" of acceptance
by the offeree has taken place, and silence by offeree does not
amount to acceptance. Raysor v. Berkeley County Railway &
Lumber Company, 26 S. C. 610, 2 S. E. 119 (1887); Stacy v.
Cherokee Foundry & Machine Works, 70 S. C. 178, 49 S. E.
223 (1904). This view is further substantiated by a later South
Carolina case that held that acceptance of proposal for insurance
must be evidenced by some act that binds accepting party, and
mental resolution that can be changed is not sufficient. Hodge v.
National Fidelity Insurance Co., 221 S. C. 33, 68 S. E. 2d 636
(1952). It has, however, been stated authoritatively that a retention of the application and premium payment for an unreasonable and unwarranted length of time may raise an inference of
acceptance.
12 AIPLIwMAN, INSURANc LAW AND PaACTIc"
§ 7226 (1943). Thus where the relations between parties have
been such as to justify the offeror to expect a reply, or when the
offeree has come under some duty to communicate either a rejection or acceptance, his failure to communicate his rejection or to
perform this duty, may result in a legal assent to the terms of the
offer. Lechler v. Montana Life Insurance Company, 48 N. D. 644,
186 N. W. 271 (1921); RiESATZImNT, CONTRACTS § 72. Actions
by the agent may have caused the applicant to take the failure to reject by the insurer as acceptance. Fleming v. Pioneer Life Insurance
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Company, 178 S. C. 226, 182 S. E. 577 (1935). A more recent
South Carolina case affirms this by stating that upon the filing of
an application, it is the duty of the insurer to act upon it with reasonable promptness and, in the meantime, to refrain from doing anything reasonably calculated to mislead the applicant. Keller v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company, 213 S.C. 339, 49 S.R.
2d 577 (1948). Where an offeree solicits the offer through its agent,
this, in the light of the relations of the parties or other surrounding circumstances, may justify the offeror, as a reasonable man, interpreting
the offeree's silence after receiving the offer as acceptance. 1 WILLIsTON, CoNTRAcTS § 91C (1936).
Constantly appearing in leading
cases supporting the aforementioned statement is the rule, "Contracts may be implied from circumstances as well as by written papers and oral agreements, and insurance contracts are no exception

to the rule as numerous cases, textbooks and digests clearly attest."
Reck v. PrudentialInsurance Company of America, 116 N. J. L. 44,
184 AtI. 777, 778 (1936). It is held in many jurisdictions that where
no policy was actually issued or delivered, there is a strong presumption that there was no contract. Equitable Life Assurance Society.
v. McElroy, 83 Fed. 631, 28 C.C.A. 365-(8th Cir. 1897). "It is a
well settled rule, established by the great weight of authority, that
mere delay in passing upon an application for insurance cannot be
construed as an acceptance thereof by the insurer which will support
an action ex contractu." Thornton.v. National Council Junior Order,
U.A.M., 110 W. Va. 412, 158 S.E.507 (1931).
As was brought out in the dissenting opinion in the instant case,
the question was not whether the agent tried to mislead the applicant, but whether she was actually misled. It could be reasonably
assumed from the facts of the case that she only "hoped" that the
policy had been issued and that she did not at any time "believe" that
it had. Failure to notify applicant should only be deemed acceptance
when in honest and practical understanding it would be so considered.
This is, of course, in accord with the objective standard test rather
than a test of moral duty. There is no definite rule in South Carolina by which we may predict what the courts will do when a particular factual situation arises as to when acceptance of an application
by the insurer takes place. This is true in that factual situations,
as well as the innumerable policy contracts, will invariably differ. If
a manner of acceptance is not expressly stipulated in the policy contract or if it is alleged that the stipulation has been waived by some
overt act of the insurer, the question should be left in the hands of
the jury. When this situation arises, the question will be regarded
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in the light most favorable to the insured, in that' the insurer was
the party which actually formulated the policy contract.
LisTm L. BAT4S, JR.

CORPORATIONS: Authority of Agent to Bind Corporation to
Life Employment Contract.- Plaintiff was injured while in defendant's employ. Defendant's district superintendent promised plaintiff a lifetime job if plaintiff would forbear to bring suit for his
injuries. Years later plaintiff was discharged without cause. Plaintiff recovered in the lower court. On appeal, HELD: reversed. The
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that company agent,
who allegedly made contract with plaintiff, had authority to enter
into contract, or that company was by its conduct estopped from
denying that agent had authority. Pullinan Co. v. Ray, 94 A. 2d 266

(Md. 1953).
Even though a corporate officer or agent may be generally authorized to hire, it is generally considered that he has no implied authority to make an agreement for life employment, Chesapeake & P.
Tel. Co. v. Murray, 84 A. 2d 870 (Md. 1951); Heaman v. 13. N.
Rowell Co., 261 N. Y. 229, 185 N. E. 83 (1933) ; WiLisroN, CoNTRAcTS § 1652 (Rev. ed. 1938). There may be an exception however where the agreement for lifetime employment is in consideration of the release of a claim for damages. Heckler v. Baltimore & 0.
Ry. Co., 167 Md. 226, 173 A. 12 (1934). In Maxson v. Michigan
Cent. R. Co., 117 Mich. 218, 75 N. W. 459 (1898), it was held that a
division superintendent had no implied authority to bind the company
to life employment, in consideration of the settlement of a claim for
damages on account of injuries. Under New York law an oral contract
of permanent life employment made by a corporation through its vice
president was unenforceable without authorization or ratification by
directors. Starr v. Superheater Co., 102 F. 2d 170 (7th Cir. 1939).
In Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. Murray, supra, it was held that a

president of a corporation does not possess authority to hire employees for life. One having general authority, as manager or other-

wise, to make contracts of employment is not usually empowered
thereby to enter into agreements for life employment. General Paint
Corp. v. Kramer, 57 F. 2d 698 (10th Cir. 1932).

Where the agent

has been held out as having such authority to employ injured person for life as an incident to settlement of an injury claim, such
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a contract will be enforced. Royster Guano Co. v. Hall, 68 F. 2d
533 (4th Cir. 1934). In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cox, 145
Ky;.667, 141 S. W. 389 (1911), in discussing a permanent employment contract the claims agent had made, the court held that, if the
corporation authorized him to make settlement, it cannot escape liability on the ground that agent exceeded his authority since such
settlement was within the apparent scope of his authority. There
may conceivably be other instances where the general rule will not
be followed, as where peculiarly valuable and necessary services cannot otherwise be secured; but authority to employ on such terms is
never lightly to be implied, but only in consequence of the weightiest considerations. GeneralPaintCorp. v. Kramer, supra. Thus even
the suggested exception to, or qualification of, the general rule is itself
subject to the limitation that no authority to make contracts for life
employment, even in consideration of a release, will be implied where
contracts of that type are neither usual in the course of the duties
for which the agent is employed nor reasonably necessary to completely and properly perform these duties. Fisherv. Lumber Co., 183
N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857 (1922) ; Babicora Development Co. v. Edelinan, 54 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
It is held in most jurisdictions that a corporate officer or agent has
no implied authority to make lifetime employment contracts unless
authorized by the directors, even in situations where the contract
is made to avoid suit against the corporation. Other jurisdictions,
basing their opinions on estoppel and ratification, hold the corporation liable on the theory that the corporation has held the agent or
officer out as having implied or apparent authority to enter into such
contracts for the corporation. This line of reasoning represents
situations where the application of the general rule would result in
great injustice to the employee. This latter view, holding the corporation estopped to disclaim liability, seems to be the better and
more logical holding; a corporation should not be allowed to reap
the benefits of a contract and then deny such contract by pleading
ultra vires on the part of the agent.
JAmEs M. ARTHUR.

INSURANCE: Right of Insured in Recovery for Compromise
by Insured With Third Party: Reasonableness of Compromise. Insured sued insurer under a liability policy to recover amount paid to
third party in settlement of claims and for attorney's fees. Claims of

Published by Scholar Commons, 1953

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 11
RZZcNT CASES
third party included claims not covered by liability policy. Insurer refused to defend insured, stating that none of the claims came within
coverage of policy. The court awarded judgment for the insured
without examining merits of third party's claims, holding that where
several claims are joined some of which are covered by policy and
where insurer refuses to defend the action, the insurer is liable for
the sum paid by the insured in a reasonable compromise of the
claims. On appeal, HELD: reversed. The insurer was liable only
for the amount of the compromise that pertained to those claims
covered by the policy. The reasonableness of the compromise cannot be construed without some examination of the merits of the
claims. Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin
v. Hendrix, 199 F. 2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952).
When an insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend an action against
insured, insured may make a reasonable settlement with injured
party, provided that insured acts in good faith and uses due care
and prudence, and brings action against insurer for amount of compromise. This result is obtained notwithstanding clause in policy
making policy void if insured makes settlement without insurer's
consent. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 201 U. S. 173 (1906); Hardware Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Hilderbrant, 119 F. 2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941); Independent
M. & Cream Co. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 68 Mont. 152, 216
Pac. 1109 (1923). Where there appears to be a reasonable possibility that the third party's claims are not covered by the policy,
the insured has been held to have not only the right but the duty
to make a settlement and then sue the insurer for reimbursement.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Stewart Dry Goods Co.,
208 Ky. 429, 271 S. W. 444 (1925). Such settlement is not conclusive upon the insurer as to the questions of the coverage of the
policy or the validity of the injured party's claims. Brinkman v.
Western Automobile Indemnity Ass'n., 205 Mo. App. 71, 218 S. W.
944 (1920); Anderson & Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 211 N. C. 23, 188 S. R. 642 (1936). Where there are
several injured parties, the insured cannot settle with one, sue the
insurer for that amount, then settle with the others, and sue for
these later amounts, as the first action is a bar to later suits, Floyd
v. American Employers' Insurance Co. of Boston, 187 S. C. 344,
197 S. E. 385 (1938) ; nor is the insurer liable where the settlement
is excessive. Elliott v. Casualty Ass'n. of America, 254 Mich. 282,
236 N. W. 782 (1931) ; Anderson & Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., supra. There is a narrow view that the insured
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cannot recover from the insurer the amount of a settlement made before an action is brought, even though the amount of the settlement is
less than the cost of defending the suit. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Cook, 186 Miss. 840, 192 So. 24 (1939). But where the in-:
surer agrees to defend the suit, the insured can still settle for amounts

that may be recovered in excess of the policy without violating any
clause of the policy, Pickett v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 60 S. C. 477,
38 S. E. 160 (1901), and a clause prohibiting settlement for the
amount in excess of the coverage of the policy is void. General
Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Louisuille Home Tel. Co.,
175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031 (1917).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is unquestionably sound
and correct. The reasonableness of the compromise is an essential
element of the insured's right to be reimbursed by the insurer. Reasonableness can only be determined by an examination of the merits
of the claim. Though the question of what is reasonable may make
application of the rule difficult in some cases, a fair and just result
cannot otherwise be obtained.
ALVIN L. McEwv=N,
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